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Abstract  
This paper examines the long-term effects of extended unemployment benefits 
that older unemployed can collect until retirement in Finland. We consider a 
reform that increased the age threshold of this scheme from 55 to 57 for people 
born in 1950 or later. Our regression discontinuity estimates show that 
postponing eligibility by two years increased employment over the remaining 
working career by seven months. Despite the corresponding reduction in 
unemployment, we find no evidence of significant effects on mortality or receipt 
of disability and sickness benefits, nor on the spouse's labor supply. We also 
compute the fiscal impact of the reform taking into account income taxes and 
social security contributions paid and benefits received. The reform increased net 
income transfers by 15,000 Euros over the 10-year period for an average 
individual. 
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1 Introduction
In many European countries, longer entitlement periods of unemployment insurance (UI)
beneﬁts are provided for older unemployed. These beneﬁt extensions can contribute to
high levels of unemployment in the oldest groups in two ways. First, employers tend
to target dismissals at those employees who qualify for extended beneﬁts. Some eligible
workers may also leave their job voluntarily to obtain more leisure time if the beneﬁt
scheme is suﬃciently generous. As a result, the oldest workers eligible for extended
beneﬁts are found to enter unemployment at a high rate (Winter-Ebmer, 2003, Kyyrä
and Wilke, 2007, Tuit and van Ours, 2010, and Baguelin and Remillon, 2014). Second,
among unemployed workers eligibility for extended beneﬁts discourages job search and
thereby prolongs unemployment spells, and such beneﬁts are often used to bridge the
time until retirement (Hunt, 1995, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004, Kyyrä and Ollikainen,
2008, Lalive, 2008, Tatsiramos, 2010, Baguelin and Remillon, 2014, and Inderbitzin et al.,
2016). While the eﬀects of extended beneﬁts on the unemployment inﬂow and the duration
of unemployment spells are well documented, their long-term eﬀects, ﬁscal impact and
eﬀects on health and spouse's behavior have been studied less.
In this paper, we study a reform in 2005 that postponed access to extended UI beneﬁts
by two years from age 55 to 57 in Finland. The Finnish scheme is rather generous in the
sense that the extended beneﬁts can be received until retirement. We ﬁnd that the two-
year increase in the eligibility age increased employment by 7 months between the ages
of 54 and 63 among private-sector workers. Despite a large reduction in the time spent
in unemployment, we ﬁnd no evidence of health eﬀects as measured by the amount of
disability and sickness beneﬁts received, and mortality by the end of 2015. Moreover,
the spouse's employment months and retirement age do not appear to be aﬀected. As
such, the only eﬀect seems to be higher employment for the group that was directly
aﬀected by the reform. This employment eﬀect amounts to an increase of 22,000 Euros in
wage income and a decrease of 11,000 Euros in unemployment-related beneﬁts on average
over the 10-year period. Higher earnings also reduce the need to rely on other beneﬁts,
such as housing allowance and social assistance, while increasing taxes and social security
contributions paid to the society. Taking all beneﬁts, income taxes and social security
contributions into account we estimate that the ﬁscal impact of the reform was around
15,000 Euros over the 10-year period for an average individual. This is a large eﬀect given
that the counterfactual level of average net transfers over the same period is about 26,000
Euros.
We reach these conclusions using a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) and
rich register data on all private-sector employees born in 1949 and 1950. The 2005 reform
only aﬀected individuals who were born in 1950 or later. As a result, the 1950 cohort
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Figure 1: Months employed in 20042013 by birth week along with a local linear smoother
became entitled to extended beneﬁts two years older than the 1949 cohort at the age
of 57. Our research design and one of the main results are illustrated in ﬁgure 1 which
depicts the average employment months over the period 2004 to 2013 for each 1-week
birth cohort around the cutoﬀ value of January 1, 1950. The reform provides an ideal
setting for RDD analysis given that the individuals cannot manipulate their eligibility
status which is based on the birth date. We also show that the individuals on both sides
of the cutoﬀ are highly similar in observable characteristics, and therefore it is likely that
they do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of unobservables either. Despite this homogeneity,
those born in 1950 worked on average notably more than those born in 1949 over the 10-
year period. The jump of 7 months at the cutoﬀ value is quite large in relation to the only
two-year diﬀerence in the minimum eligibility age for extended beneﬁts. This implies that
the extended beneﬁt scheme as a whole must have a large negative impact on employment
of the oldest worker groups.
Our results are in line with previous research showing that the risk of job loss is
higher for workers who can qualify for extended beneﬁts and that those unemployed who
are entitled to extended beneﬁts experience much longer unemployment spells.1 Our
ﬁndings complement the existing studies by providing evidence of the full impact of these
employment eﬀects in the form of changes in employment months and wages over the
remaining working career. We also provide evidence of the extent to which various income
transfers counteract the wage losses. The previous literature has not been able to assess
1In the Finnish context, Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector
workers at least doubles at the minimum eligibility age, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that
approximately one half of unemployed workers eligible for the beneﬁt extension withdraw from job search
entirely.
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ﬁscal impacts at such a detailed level. In addition, we contribute to the literature by
examining broader impacts of extended beneﬁts in terms of health, program substitution
and spouse's labor supply.
Some previous studies have found a positive association between unemployment and
mortality (e.g. Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009, and Eliason and Storrie, 2009), but
to the best of our knowledge the eﬀects on older unemployed with access to extended
beneﬁts have not been studied. Since extended beneﬁts essentially secure the income for
an unemployed person until retirement and extended beneﬁts can be regarded as an early
retirement scheme, it may be that many of the negative eﬀects of unemployment on an
individual's health may be absent. This could explain why we ﬁnd no change in mortality
despite the large drop in unemployment months.
Unlike some other studies (e.g. Inderbitzin et al., 2016), we ﬁnd that eligibility for
extended UI beneﬁts has no eﬀect on receipt of sickness and disability beneﬁts. Further-
more, although several studies have found that the labor supply decisions of older couples
are interrelated (e.g. Blau, 1998, Michaud, 2003, Zweimuller et al., 1996, and Lalive and
Parrotta, 2016), we ﬁnd no eﬀect on spouse's behavior even though the extended be-
neﬁts act as a pathway to early retirement for many unemployed workers. It could be
that the involuntary nature of unemployment for most aﬀected workers causes diﬀerences
compared to the setting in which both spouses' decisions concern regular retirement.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the
unemployment-related beneﬁts for older workers in Finland. Section 3 presents our rese-
arch design and section 4 describes our data. Section 5 reports our estimation results and
in section 6 we discuss the robustness of these results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Institutional setting
In Finland, UI beneﬁts are paid by unemployment funds. Membership is voluntary, but
as many as 90% of all workers are enrolled in unemployment funds. The beneﬁt level
is determined by the average earnings over the past 34 weeks of employment. Unlike in
most other countries, there is no cap in the beneﬁt level, but the replacement rate declines
rapidly with the past earnings. Those who are not eligible for UI beneﬁts may qualify for
a ﬂat-rate labor market subsidy paid by the Social Insurance Institution. This beneﬁt is
means-tested but available indeﬁnitely for the needy.
During our observation period, unemployment fund members with suﬃcient work
history who lost their job were entitled to 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts provided that they
had registered as an unemployed job seeker at the public employment service. However,
older unemployed constitute an exception as those above a certain age threshold on the
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day when their regular beneﬁts expire (and who have been working for at least 5 years
in the past 20 years) qualify for extended beneﬁts which can be received until retirement.
The age threshold for the beneﬁt extension has been raised gradually over time. It was
increased from 55 to 57 in 1997 for all workers, from 57 to 59 years in 2005 for those born
in or after 1950, from 59 to 60 in 2010 for those born in or after 1955, and from 60 to the
current 61 in 2014 for those born in or after 1957.
In addition, long-term unemployed individuals born before 1950 were entitled to an
unemployment pension between the ages of 60 and 64, which was then followed by con-
ventional old-age pension at the age of 65. The unemployment pension was abolished in
2005 but only from later cohorts. The combination of regular and extended UI beneﬁts
(and unemployment pension for those born before 1950) is known as the unemployment
tunnel (UT) scheme. The changes in eligibility for this scheme over time by cohort and
age are illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
In this study, we focus solely on workers born in 1949 and 1950, of whom those born
in the latter year were aﬀected by the 2005 reform. Unemployed workers born in 1949
who reached the age of 57 before running out of their regular beneﬁts were allowed to
collect extended beneﬁts until the age of 60, after which they could claim unemployment
pension. This means that a newly unemployed individual had to be at least 55 years
and 1 month of age when becoming unemployed to be eligible for the UT scheme. As a
consequence of the 2005 reform, the individuals born in 1950 had to be at least 57 and 1
month at the time of unemployment entry in order to be able to receive UI beneﬁts until
old-age pension. These individuals could move freely into old-age pension between the
ages of 62 and 65. The two-year increase in the age threshold was the major change in
the 2005 reform, albeit two other changes may have played some role as well.
First, as pointed out above, the unemployment pension was abolished and replaced
by additional weeks of extended UI beneﬁts for the individuals born in 1950 or later.
The compensation level of unemployment pension was determined by previous earnings
but over a longer period than that used for determining the UI beneﬁt. As a result,
the unemployment pension could be either higher or lower than the preceding UI beneﬁt
depending on the individual's earnings proﬁle. In most cases, the levels of these beneﬁts
were close to each other but the unemployment pension was on average somewhat higher
than the UI beneﬁt. The UT scheme thus provided a slightly lower average beneﬁt level
for the 1950 cohort than for the 1949 cohort, which may have reduced attractiveness of
the scheme as an early exit pathway among individuals born in 1950.
Second, large employers are partially liable for the costs of extra beneﬁts received by
their former employees under the UT scheme, and the way these liabilities were determined
diﬀers between individuals born in 1949 and 1950. When an extended beneﬁt is granted
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Figure 2: Eligibility for the unemployment tunnel scheme by cohort and year
to the worker born in 1950 or later, the former employer may have to pay a given share
of the extended beneﬁt costs as a lump sum payment to the Unemployment Insurance
Fund. This cost share increases linearly from 0% to 80% as a function of ﬁrm size.2 In
the case of the long-term unemployed born before 1950, the former employer had to pay a
similarly deﬁned share of the unemployment pension costs to the pension provider. The
reason for the change in the employer liabilities was purely technical and dictated by the
fact that the unemployment pension was abolished from the later cohorts. However, the
employer's costs from their former employees drawing beneﬁts under the UT scheme have
been slightly lower on average for individuals born in 1950 than for those born in 1949.
This may have induced large employers to lay oﬀ their older workers born in 1950 more
easily than those born in 1949.3
3 Research design
Given that the 2005 reform only aﬀected individuals born in 1950 or later, we adopt a
sharp regression discontinuity design around the birth time cutoﬀ of January 1, 1950 (e.g.
2The cost of extended beneﬁts is calculated assuming the worker will collect them until age 63 (the
minimum old-age retirement age since 2005) irrespective of the actual behavior. In the case of a worker
who qualiﬁes for an old-age pension before the regular beneﬁts expire, the former employer is liable for
a share of the costs of regular beneﬁts actually paid to the worker.
3Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) analyze a reform that changed the premium rates in 2000 and ﬁnd that
the experience rating of the unemployment pension costs reduced early exits from work among older
workers.
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Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In particular, we estimate nonparametric local linear models of
the form
yi = α + γ1 [di ≥ d0] + β1(di − d0) + β2(di − d0)1 [di ≥ d0] + εi, (1)
where yi is an outcome for individual i (e.g. months employed or earnings), di is birth date,
and 1 [di ≥ d0] is an indicator for those born on January 1, 1950 (= d0) or later. Under
the identifying assumption that the disturbance term εi does not have a discontinuity at
d0, γ provides an estimate of the local average treatment eﬀect for the 2005 reform, i.e.
the eﬀect of becoming eligible for the UT scheme at age 57 instead of age 55 (with the
unemployment pension replaced by additional days of extended UI beneﬁts) on individuals
born in the ﬁrst day of 1950. Control variables for background characteristics of the
individuals are not required for identiﬁcation but their inclusion may improve precision.
We report results both with and without control variables.
To implement the RDD approach we need to choose the kernel function for weighting
the observations and the bandwidth to determine the sample size around the cutoﬀ. The
choice of the kernel function makes little diﬀerence in practice. We use the triangular
kernel that is widely used in applied work. Calonico et al. (2014) argue that commonly
used bandwidth selectors tend to yield bandwidths that are too large to ensure the vali-
dity of the underlying distributional approximations, potentially leading to non-negligible
bias. They propose an alternative method where the RDD point estimate is corrected
by an estimated bias term, and the standard error estimates are adjusted for additional
variability that results from the estimation of the bias correction term. We report both
the conventional and bias-corrected point estimates. We select the bandwidth such that
the point estimator for the bias-corrected estimate is mean square error (MSE) optimal
using a procedure developed by Calonico et al. (2016). We also study the sensitivity of
our results to the chosen bandwidth and polynomial order.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the Finnish Linked Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) of Statistics Finland for
years 2001 to 2013. This database combines information from several administrative regis-
ters, and it covers the entire Finnish population between the ages of 15 to 70 as well as the
universe of private-sector ﬁrms. The data provides information on earnings, employment,
unemployment, education and some characteristics of the employer. We supplement this
data by merging additional information from other databases of Statistics Finland. We
obtain information on deaths up to the end of 2015 from Population Statistics and Cause-
of-death Statistics. This enables us to consider mortality as an outcome. In addition we
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merge information on various beneﬁts received and taxes paid by individuals and house-
holds from Total Statistics on Income Distribution. These data are based on information
from diﬀerent authorities, including the Social Insurance Institution, the Financial Su-
pervisory Authority, the Finnish Center for Pensions and the Tax Administration. The
beneﬁt records include unemployment beneﬁts, pension beneﬁts, sickness and disability
beneﬁts, housing allowance and social assistance, and the tax records include labor and
capital taxes and social security contributions paid by employees. With this informa-
tion we can assess how the 2005 reform aﬀected public ﬁnances through increased taxes
and social security contributions and reduced beneﬁt payments caused by higher employ-
ment. The resulting net transfers variable does not however account for social security
contributions that are paid by employers.
The FLEED also includes an identiﬁer for each individual's spouse, which we use to link
spouse's records from the above registers to the individuals in our sample.4 This enables us
to analyze spillover eﬀects on spouse's behavior and overall eﬀects at the household level.
We consider two measures of spouse's labor supply: the retirement age and months worked
in the years 2004 to 2013. For couples we compute household earned income by taking
the sum of both spouses' earned income (i.e. all taxable income except capital income).
This measure ignores the earned income of children and other people possibly living in the
same household. In addition, we consider household disposable income which captures
the role of the tax and income transfer system. Unlike the household earned income, this
measure includes the incomes of all individuals living in the same household.
We limit our analysis to individuals born in 1949 or 1950 who worked in the private
sector in 2001, that is, 3 or 5 years prior to eligibility to the UT scheme. This sample
includes 62% of both cohorts. The unemployment risk in the public sector was very low
for these cohorts and the UT scheme is mainly used by large private-sector ﬁrms when
downsizing. We also run our main analyses using data on workers employed in the public
sector in 2001, but did not ﬁnd evidence of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the 2005
reform for them. We do not report these results but they are available on request.
Figure 3 displays the number of observations by birth week. Seasonal variation in
birth dates shows up in the frequencies. However, there is no bunching of observations
around January 1, 1950, which is not surprising given that the manipulation of the birth
date in the administrative register data is impossible (our research design also passes a
formal McCrary density test).
Table 1 displays sample statistics by birth year. Our sample includes 67,352 individu-
als, of whom 33,941 were born in 1949 and 33,411 in 1950. In the analysis of long-term
4Spouses in our data set are deﬁned as couples who are cohabiting, married or have a registered civil
partnership (i.e. same sex marriage).
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Figure 3: Number of observations per week by birth week
eﬀects we only include those for whom we observe the outcomes in all years between
2004 and 2013, which reduces the sample size by 5.3%. As seen in panel A, individual
characteristics such as gender, geographical area and education which are correlated with
earnings and other outcomes are almost identical for the two cohorts. In order to assess
this more rigorously we also show RDD estimates for the jump at the beginning of 1950
using a six months bandwidth. The point estimates for the discontinuity are all statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant for the afore mentioned characteristics. Since large ﬁrms in particular
use the UT scheme as a soft way to get rid oﬀ workers when they downsize (Kyyrä and
Wilke, 2007), we also examine the share of individuals working in ﬁrms with over 250
employees. This share appears to be almost the same for the two cohorts and no jump is
detected.
A nice feature of our research design is that we can examine outcomes prior to the
reform in order to check whether other discontinuities at the birth date threshold could
cause discontinuities in the outcomes, although we are not aware of any other reform
aﬀecting only one of the two cohorts. Panel B of table 1 displays means for our outcome
variables in 2003, when neither cohort was eligible for the UT scheme. These sample
means are remarkably similar across the cohorts. Earned income, which is basically all
taxable income except capital income, as well as annual wages have similar means in the
two cohorts and the RDD estimates indicate no discontinuity at the threshold. The same
is true for diﬀerent types of beneﬁts. We also consider net transfers, i.e. the diﬀerence
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by birth year
Born in Born in Discontinuity at
1949 1950 January 1, 1950
Mean SD Mean SD Coeﬃcient SE
A. Covariates in 2003
Share female, % 42.9 49.5 43.1 49.5 0.20*** 1.20
Share living in major cities, % 34.8 47.6 35.0 47.7 -1.38*** 1.08
Share with tertiary education, % 25.8 43.8 25.7 43.7 0.97*** 1.19
Share working in large ﬁrms, % 32.5 46.8 32.1 46.7 1.31*** 1.23
B. Individual outcomes in 2003
Months employed 10.7 3.3 10.8 3.2 -0.10*** 0.07
Wages (annual) 35,806 24,635 36,056 24,455 13*** 705
Months unemployed 0.6 2.1 0.6 2.0 0.02*** 0.05
Unemployment beneﬁts 810 2,885 806 2,854 78*** 76
Earned income (annual) 40,686 23,373 40,767 23,206 279*** 659
Sickness and disability beneﬁts 980 3,747 899 3,618 84*** 103
Net transfers 10,710 13,160 10,752 12,966 -534*** 362
Observations 33,941 33,411 33,170
C. Household outcomes in 2003
Spouse's age 53.8 4.4 52.9 4.4 -0.09*** 0.14
Spouse's months employed 9.3 4.7 9.5 4.5 0.19*** 0.14
Household earned income 77,501 33,823 77,675 33,225 653*** 1,147
Household disposable income 63,238 28,078 63,257 27,535 309*** 864
Observations 22,325 21,990 21,187
D. Individual outcomes in 20042013
Months employed 76.1 39.1 87.9 35.8 6.70*** 0.73
Wages 233,191 206,015 271,095 214,479 22,957*** 4,120
Unemployment months 19.5 31.4 13.2 22.5 -7.90*** 0.53
Unemployment beneﬁts 27,336 43,951 18,091 29,787 -11,052*** 737
Earned income 344,440 203,913 358,532 207,615 9,892*** 4,049
Sickness and disability beneﬁts 20,640 48,712 22,755 49,213 449*** 950
Net transfers 19,429 121,523 47,087 121,239 13,488*** 2,377
Share deceased by 2015, % 6.9 25.4 6.3 24.4 -0.45*** 0.57
Observations 32,048 31,709 31,404
E. Household outcomes in 20042013
Spouse's retirement age 59.3 5.5 59.1 5.7 -0.64*** 0.44
Spouse's months employed 73.5 44.8 79.0 43.9 0.11*** 1.08
Household earned income 668,468 300,616 688,987 302,882 8,657*** 7,370
Household disposable income 567,698 250,482 579,937 251,541 7,585*** 6,071
Observations 22,325 21,990 21,187
Notes: All incomes are in 2013 Euros. Unemployment beneﬁts also include unemployment pension. Earned income is all
taxable income except capital income, i.e. it includes also all taxable beneﬁts. Net transfers are calculated as the diﬀerence
between income taxes and social security contributions paid and beneﬁts received, with the tax component including all
labor and capital taxes and the beneﬁt component consisting of unemployment beneﬁts, pension beneﬁts, sickness and
disability beneﬁts, housing allowance and social assistance. The share deceased is calculated based on the sample observed
in 2003. The sample for the spouse's retirement age only includes the spouses who retired by 2014. This includes 16,525
spouses for the 1949 cohort and 14,688 spouses for the 1950 cohort. The last two columns show RDD estimates for the
discontinuity at the cutoﬀ based on the triangular kernel and a six month bandwidth on both sides of the cutoﬀ. Signiﬁcance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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between income taxes and social security contributions paid and beneﬁts received as an
outcome. Taxes paid include all labor and capital taxes, and social security contributions
consist of health insurance, unemployment insurance and pension contributions. Beneﬁts
received include unemployment beneﬁts, pension beneﬁts, sickness and disability beneﬁts,
housing allowance and social assistance. The means of net transfers are similar in the two
cohorts and no discontinuity is detected at the threshold.
Previous research for other countries has shown that educational attainment and, con-
sequently, labor market outcomes can be aﬀected by season of birth through compulsory
schooling laws or relative age eﬀects (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991, and Plug, 2001).5
This is a cause of concern because our analysis relies on comparing individuals born at
the very end of 1949 to individuals born early in 1950. However, the lack of signiﬁcant
discontinuities in educational level (panel A) and pre-reform outcomes (panel B) should
mitigate such concerns.
As we will also study spouses' outcomes, table 1 also shows the age of the spouse in
2003 (panel C). There could plausibly be selection such that the spouse is more likely to be
from the same cohort and thereby aﬀected by the 2005 reform in the same way. This may
indirectly inﬂuence the outcomes of the sample members if the labor market outcomes of
the spouses are interrelated. However, no discontinuity in the spouse's age is observed at
the cutoﬀ. Also the pre-reform outcomes for the spouses and at the household level in 2003
appear similar in the two cohorts with no signiﬁcant discontinuities at the cutoﬀ (panel
C). It should be noted that in the analysis of spouse and household outcomes we only
include individuals who are observed with the same spouse during our whole observation
period from 2004 to 2013. This reduces the sample size for both the cohorts by about one
third.
The outcomes over the years 2004 to 2013 at the individual and household levels
are reported in panels D and E. There are notable diﬀerences in unemployment and
employment months, wages, unemployment beneﬁts and net transfers between individuals
born in 1949 and 1950. However, none of diﬀerences in the household-level outcomes in
the subsample of the couples is statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional risk levels. We
will return to these diﬀerences in the next section where we discuss them at length.
Table 2 shows characteristics and outcomes for individuals in each cohort conditional
on whether they experienced any unemployment during the years 2004 to 2013. In both
cohorts 49% of the individuals experienced at least one spell of unemployment during
the 10-year period. The key diﬀerence is that job losers in the 1949 cohort remained
unemployed for about one year longer than those born in 1950 (39 vs. 27 months). These
5Kaila (2017) studies short-term eﬀects of the relative school starting age in Finland and ﬁnds that
those who are born early in the calendar year and therefore start school at a relatively older age are more
likely to be admitted to and graduate from academic track high school.
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Table 2: Sample means conditional on any unemployment during 20042013 by birth year
1949 1950
Experienced unemployment in 20042013: No Yes No Yes
A. Covariates in 2003 (%)
Share female 43.6 42.2 43.8 42.3
Share living in major cities 38.8 30.6 38.7 31.1
Share with tertiary education 30.8 20.6 30.3 20.9
Share working in large ﬁrms 29.9 35.2 30.1 34.2
Industry:
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6
Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
Manufacturing 21.7 37.4 22.8 38.0
Utilities 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4
Construction 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.4
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 17.2 12.5 17.0 11.7
Hotels and restaurants 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.4
Transport and communication 8.5 5.5 8.4 5.3
Financial intermediation 6.0 2.5 5.9 2.0
Real estate, business services 12.2 7.6 12.2 8.1
Public administration and defense 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.3
Education, health and social work 7.8 4.2 7.7 4.1
Other community, social and personal service activities 7.0 2.8 7.1 3.1
Other 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9
Observations 17,330 16,611 16,983 16,428
B. Individual outcomes in 20042013
Months employed 91.4 60.5 98.5 77.2
Months unemployed 0.0 39.4 0.0 26.6
Wages 281,037 184,373 307,617 234,162
Earned income 391,194 296,737 400,429 316,165
Unemployment beneﬁts 0 55,227 0 36,385
Sickness and disability beneﬁts 27,485 13,655 27,227 18,232
Net transfers 61,253 -23,245 79,834 13,973
Share deceased by 2015 (%) 7.8 6.0 7.1 5.5
Observations 16,185 15,863 15,943 15,766
C. Household outcomes in 20042013
Spouse's retirement age 59.5 59.1 59.2 58.9
Spouse's months employed 76.2 70.4 81.6 76.3
Household earned income 728,722 603,761 742,437 632,670
Household disposable income 622,498 508,847 630,311 526,862
Observations 11,540 10,785 11,268 10,722
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longer unemployment periods are of course reﬂected in the amount of unemployment and
employment-related incomes received over the years 2004 to 2013, leading to a substantial
gap in the net transfers. In particular, the unemployed in the 1949 cohort received on
average 23,000 Euros more in various beneﬁts than they paid in income taxes and social
security contributions whereas those born in 1950 paid 14,000 Euros more in taxes and
social security contributions than they received in beneﬁts.
In panel A of table 2, diﬀerences in the background characteristics in 2003 between
individuals who ended up in unemployment at some point and those who did not are highly
similar for the two cohorts. This suggests that the selection process into unemployment
is similar except that those born in 1949 became unemployed at younger ages. The
higher share of manufacturing employees among those with at least one unemployment
spell is related to the more extensive use of the UT scheme in the large manufacturing
ﬁrms. In both cohorts the share deceased is slightly smaller for those with unemployment
experiences, which is a somewhat unexpected observation.
5 Results
5.1 Individual outcomes
Figure 4 displays how employment and unemployment evolve from 2003 to 2011 for in-
dividuals born in 1949 and 1950. The dots represent the average of employment and
unemployment months for each 1-week birth cohort around the cutoﬀ value of January
1, 1950 and the solid lines show local linear smoothers. In 2003, when neither cohort was
eligible for the extended beneﬁts, there is no diﬀerence between those born in diﬀerent
years. In other years there are notable diﬀerences between individuals born at the end of
1949 and those born at the beginning of 1950, and these increase from 2005 to 2008 by
which time the 1950 cohort had become eligible. In relative terms, the gap in employment
between the cohorts increases over all years as the employment level declines with age.
In 2008, for example, the individuals born in January 1950 worked roughly one month
more (10% more) and spent the same amount of time less in unemployment (about 50%
less) than those born in December 1949. In 2011 many of those born in 1949 were on
unemployment pension and the average of the sum of months unemployed and months
on unemployment pension is shown separately. It is quite striking that an average worker
in the 1949 cohort spent almost one third of the year collecting unemployment-related
beneﬁts.
We examine the long-run eﬀects of the 2005 reform graphically in ﬁgure 5 and report
the RDD estimates for the same outcomes in table 3. Figure 5a shows the total amount
of months employed during the 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. As would be expected
13
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from the yearly graphs in ﬁgure 4, there is a clear jump in total employment months at
the cutoﬀ and the estimates in column 1 of table 3 imply that the two-year increase in the
age limit for extended beneﬁts leads to those born in early 1950 working approximately 7
months (9%) more during the 10-year period. These estimates are robust to the inclusion
of covariates. In line with the increase in months employed the reform also increases
total wages over the 10-year period by about 9% (ﬁgure 5b and column 2 of table 3).
Correspondingly, those born after the cutoﬀ spend over 8 months less time unemployed
(ﬁgure 5c and column 3 of table 3), which implies 40% lower receipts of unemployment-
related beneﬁts (ﬁgure 5d and column 4 of table 3).6
The diﬀerence in total earned income at the cutoﬀ is less clear in ﬁgure 5e but the
estimates in column 5 of table 3 are signiﬁcant and imply that the reform led to an increase
of just under 4% in earned income over the 10-year period. As earned income includes
both labor income and unemployment beneﬁts, the opposite eﬀects of the reform on these
two outcomes counteract each other and lead to a more subdued eﬀect on earned income.
The UT scheme acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed in the sense
that only a small share of job losers entitled to extended beneﬁts return to employment
before old-age pension. One concern is that the scheme is a close substitute for other
early retirement options, mainly for disability beneﬁts that are payable to all working age
individuals with a diagnosed disability.7 If this is the case, restrictions in the access to the
UT scheme can increase the disability inﬂow, mitigating the employment eﬀect of such
changes. Another possibility is, of course, that those not entitled to extended beneﬁts
end up taking more sick leave. Uusitalo and Nivalainen (2013) and Kyyrä (2015) do not
ﬁnd evidence that the past increases in the age threshold would have had notable spillover
eﬀects on the inﬂow to disability beneﬁts in Finland. Our analysis is consistent with these
previous ﬁndings given that the point estimates for the eﬀects on combined sickness and
disability beneﬁts are small and not statistically signiﬁcant in column 6 of table 3.
As our data include comprehensive information on income taxes and social security
contributions paid and all beneﬁts received, we are able to assess how the increases in
employment caused by the reform aﬀect the net amount that individuals contribute to
public ﬁnances.8 Figure 5g and column 7 of table 3 indicate that raising the eligibility
6The cumulative unemployment beneﬁts displayed here also include unemployment pension.
7Inderbitzin et al. (2016) study the interaction between extended UI beneﬁts and take-up of disability
beneﬁts and retirement beneﬁts in Austria. They ﬁnd program complementarity (i.e. increased take-up
of UI followed by higher disability or retirement beneﬁts) for one age group and program substitution
(i.e. higher take-up of UI but lower take-up of disability insurance) for older age groups. Lammers et al.
(2013) ﬁnd evidence of a higher outﬂow to sickness and disability insurance schemes following stricter
search requirements for older unemployed in the Netherlands.
8Some beneﬁts, e.g. housing allowance, are paid at the household level. In our data such beneﬁts are
registered for the individual who applied for the beneﬁt. This inﬂuences beneﬁt amounts on both sides
of the cutoﬀ similarly and should therefore not pose a problem in our analysis.
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Figure 5: Average outcomes by birth week along with a local linear smoother
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age of the UT scheme caused individuals born in early 1950 to pay 13,000 to 15,000
Euros (50% to 60%) more in net transfers to the society during the period from 2004 to
2013 than those born in late 1949. It should be noted that transfers here also include
unemployment pensions and other pension payments.
Previous research has linked unemployment to increases in mortality (e.g. Sullivan
and von Wachter, 2009, and Eliason and Storrie, 2009). To the extent that eligibility to
extended beneﬁts implies an increase in the incidence and length of unemployment, this
could also have implications in terms of mortality. In the case of unemployed workers
with access to extended beneﬁts, the psychological and ﬁnancial stress of unemployment
may, however, be somewhat lower than for those not entitled to these beneﬁts in earlier
stages of working life. Furthermore, it is possible that some of the workers eligible for
the UT scheme leave employment voluntarily through this scheme, i.e. the layoﬀ decision
may be based on a mutual agreement with the employer. Figure 5h and column 8 of
table 3 indicate no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the 2005 reform on mortality, with the share
deceased by 2015 displaying no statistically signiﬁcant discontinuity at the cutoﬀ. As
potential other outcomes aﬀected by the reform we also examined the probability that an
individual migrates within the country or emigrates but the eﬀects on these outcomes are
not statistically signiﬁcant (results not shown, available on request).
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the observations in previous studies that those entitled to
extended beneﬁts are more likely to become unemployed and less likely to subsequently
return to employment. The full impact of the two-year increase of the age limit for
extended beneﬁts on labor market outcomes is manifested in the substantially higher
amounts of employment months and wages for those subject to the higher age limit.
The fact that earned income is aﬀected to a much lesser extent implies that the social
transfer system compensates substantially for lower employment in the group who become
entitled to extended beneﬁts at a younger age. This can also be seen in the diﬀerence in
net transfers over the 10-year period.
5.2 Spouse and household outcomes
Some studies, such as Blau (1998), Zweimuller et al. (1996), Michaud (2003), and Lalive
and Parrotta (2016), indicate that couples' retirement decisions may depend on each
other. It may be the case that when an individual becomes unemployed and is entitled to
extended beneﬁts and unemployment pension, this aﬀects the labor supply of the spouse.
Yet it is not clear, in which direction the eﬀect would go. On the one hand, the decision
may be associated with shared tastes for leisure and the spouse is more inclined to reduce
18
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Figure 6: Average spouse and household outcomes by birth week along with a local linear
smoother
labor supply when their partner gains access to the UT scheme.9 On the other hand,
ﬁnancial concerns may induce the spouse to maintain or increase his or her labor supply
when the partner is unemployed. For the older unemployed ﬁnding a new job can be
particularly diﬃcult and hence the risk of long-term unemployment would be high even
in the absence of disincentive eﬀects due to the extended beneﬁt period.
Figure 6 and table 4 analyze outcomes for the spouses of our sample members and
outcomes at the household level. The spouse's average retirement age in ﬁgure 6a shows no
clear pattern and the estimates in column 1 of table 4 indicate that there is no statistically
signiﬁcant discontinuity at the cutoﬀ. In line with this ﬁnding, the spouse's months
employed do not appear to be aﬀected by the increase in the age limit of extended beneﬁts
(ﬁgure 6b and column 2 of table 4). The household earned income in ﬁgure 6c shows a
slight jump at the cutoﬀ as would be expected from the estimates for the earned income of
our target population, but the eﬀect is muted by the earnings of the spouse and the point
estimates for the discontinuity in column 3 of table 4 are not statistically signiﬁcant. Yet
9For example, Lalive and Parrotta (2016) ﬁnd that women reduce their labor force participation when
their partner reaches pension eligibility.
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the size of the eﬀect is very close to the eﬀect on the individual's earned income in column
5 of table 3, even though the estimates are obtained from somewhat diﬀerent samples.
Our data also enable us to examine household disposable income, which is total hou-
sehold income net of all transfer payments. This measure therefore includes all income
of the members of the household and all transfers that are determined at the household
level, like housing allowance and social assistance. As such, it provides a measure of the
full ﬁnancial impact of the reform at the household level when taking into consideration
all transfers received and paid. There is a slight discontinuity in household disposable
income at the threshold, with households with a family member born in early 1950 dis-
playing slightly higher disposable income than households of the 1949 cohort in ﬁgure
6d. However, the point estimates for the eﬀect are not statistically signiﬁcant in column
4 of table 4. It should be noted that the analysis of household outcomes only includes
those who are observed with the same spouse during our whole observation period. This
obviously reduces the sample and therefore statistical power.
We also considered as an outcome the probability that the spouse changes or is missing
between 2004 and 2013 for those who had a spouse in 2003. This probability does not
appear to be aﬀected by the increase in the age limit of extended beneﬁts and subsequent
decrease in the incidence and length of unemployment (results not shown, available on
request).
It is possible that there are gender diﬀerences in how extended beneﬁts as an early
retirement scheme aﬀect the labor supply of the spouse. In addition, the relative age of
the spouse can inﬂuence the extent to which the spouse can and will adjust his or her
labor supply. We have examined these possibilities by running the spouse and household
level analyses presented above separately for men and women as well as separately for
couples where the spouse is younger/older than the individual in our analysis sample.
The relative age of the spouse does not appear to aﬀect the results and also in the case
of gender the results remain largely unchanged. There is a decrease in the retirement age
at the cutoﬀ for female spouses, but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant and does not
show up in the spouse's cumulative months employed. The eﬀect of the two-year increase
in the age limit for extended beneﬁts has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on household
disposable income when the aﬀected individual is male (results not shown, available on
request). This can be related to men's higher wages and to the fact that the use of
extended beneﬁts as a soft way of downsizing is prevalent in male dominated occupations
in the manufacturing sector.
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Table 4: Linear regression discontinuity estimates of the 2005 reform on spouses' cumu-
lative outcomes over the years 20042013
Spouse's
retirement
age
Spouse's
months
employed
Household
earned
income
Household
disposable
income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of dependent variable 59.3 76.0 673,069 566,107
A. No covariates
Conventional estimates -0.1 -0.1 9,152 7,792
[ 0.2] [ 1.3] [ 9,083] [ 7,779]
Bias-corrected estimates -0.2 0.0 9,478 7,705
[ 0.2] [ 1.6] [ 10,951] [ 9,441]
Bandwidth 205.2 197.3 195.2 187.4
Observations 17,522 22,826 22,559 21,556
B. With covariates
Conventional estimates -0.1 -0.4 7,760 6,921
[ 0.2] [ 1.3] [ 7100] [ 6466]
Bias-corrected estimates -0.2 -0.3 8,388 7,306
[ 0.2] [ 1.5] [ 8566] [ 7856]
Bandwidth 214.6 204.7 245.1 216.4
Observations 18,306 23,656 28,429 25,065
Notes: Outcome variables are total amounts for years 20042013. Estimation and bandwidth selection
are based on procedures discussed in Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2016). Polynomial order
for bias correction is quadratic. Covariates include indicators for gender, for having a university degree,
for living in major city and for being employed by a large ﬁrm in 2001. Bandwidths are mean square
error optimal for the bias-corrected estimator and symmetric on both sides of the cutoﬀ. Mean of the
dependent variable is for individuals born in the last quarter of 1949. Robust standard errors reported
for bias-corrected estimates. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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6 Robustness
In order to examine the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we
perform a number of sensitivity analyses. Figure 7 displays bias-corrected local linear es-
timates including control variables for a range of bandwidths. The vertical red line in each
graph depicts the MSE optimal bandwidth of Calonico et al. (2016). The graphs indicate
that the results for months employed, wages, months unemployed and unemployment be-
neﬁts are robust to the chosen bandwidth. The results for the eﬀect on earned income
are relatively stable after bandwidths of roughly 3 months and become more precise at
wider bandwidths. This is in line with the observation that the eﬀect on earned income is
roughly the combination of the eﬀects on wages and unemployment-related transfers. The
point estimates for combined sickness and disability beneﬁts are relatively stable close to
zero at a wide range of bandwidths. The results for the eﬀect on net transfers are stable
and also statistically signiﬁcant for a wide range of bandwidths. The point estimate for
mortality is stable around zero for all but the very narrowest bandwidths.
Figure 8 shows the sensitivity of the estimates for spouse and household outcomes
to varying the bandwidth used in estimation. The point estimate of the eﬀect on the
retirement age of the spouse is negative for all bandwidths, and it is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% risk level for a small interval of the bandwidths around 16 weeks. By contrast,
the eﬀect on spouse's months employed is stable around zero for the whole range of
bandwidths, strengthening the view that the labor supply of the spouse is not aﬀected.
The household earned income and disposable income do not diﬀer statistically signiﬁcantly
from zero at any bandwidth. It should be kept in mind that the sample used for analysing
spouses' outcomes is smaller than our base sample because we only include those who are
observed with the same spouse during our whole observation period. This obviously
reduces statistical power somewhat.
We further analyze the validity of our research design by examining whether there are
discontinuities at placebo cutoﬀs. Figure 9 shows the estimated discontinuities at cutoﬀs
every week for 12 months before and 12 months after the actual threshold at January 1,
1950. The results are from local linear estimations including covariates and using the MSE
optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2016). The results provide evidence in
support of our main results, as there are hardly any discontinuities of similar magnitude
at placebo cutoﬀ points for months employed, wages, months unemployed, unemployment
beneﬁts and net transfers. The eﬀect at the true cutoﬀ for the earned income in the years
20042013 is also larger than at most placebo cutoﬀs, but not as clearly discernible. As
would be expected from our main results, for sickness and disability beneﬁts as well as
for the share deceased the eﬀects at the true cutoﬀ are indistinguishable from those at
alternative cutoﬀs.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of the results for individual outcomes to bandwidth
Notes: Solid lines represent bias-corrected estimates using alternative bandwidths. Dashed lines depict
the 95% conﬁdence interval and the vertical red lines denote the MSE optimal bandwidth of Calonico
et al. (2016).
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of the results for spouse and household outcomes to bandwidth
Notes: Solid lines represent bias-corrected estimates using alternative bandwidths. Dashed lines depict
95% conﬁdence interval and vertical red lines denote the MSE optimal bandwidth of Calonico et al.
(2016).
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Figure 9: Placebo thresholds for individual outcomes
Notes: Solid lines represent bias-corrected estimates using the MSE optimal bandwidth of Calonico et al.
(2016) at alternative cutoﬀs of the birth date. Dashed lines depict the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
p-values refer to the share of estimates that are larger in absolute value than the estimate at the true
cutoﬀ. Data on individuals born in 1948 and 1951 are included to enable the placebo analysis over the
whole two years around the true cutoﬀ.
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Figure 10: Placebo thresholds for spouse and household outcomes
Notes: Solid lines represent bias-corrected estimates using the MSE optimal bandwidth of Calonico et al.
(2016) at alternative cutoﬀs of the birth date. Dashed lines depict the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
p-values refer to the share of estimates that are larger in absolute value than the estimate at the true
cutoﬀ. Data on individuals born in 1948 and 1951 are included to enable the placebo analysis over the
whole two years around the true cutoﬀ.
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Figure 10 shows similar placebo analyses for the spouse and household outcomes.
Considering our imprecise results from the main analysis for these outcomes, it is unsur-
prising that the eﬀects at the true cutoﬀ are not discernible in these graphs but similar
sized discontinuities are found at various thresholds from January 1949 to December 1950.
In addition to alternative bandwidths and placebo cutoﬀs we have also considered
the sensitivity of our results to the polynomial order of our speciﬁcation. We estimated
models both with and without additional controls using a quadratic speciﬁcation for the
point estimate and a cubic speciﬁcation for the bias correction term. These results are
very close to those from our linear speciﬁcation (results not shown, available on request).
7 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence that the age at which the individual becomes eligible for
extended unemployment beneﬁts has a substantial impact on labor market outcomes over
the last years of the working career. We ﬁnd that a two-year increase in the age limit
for extended beneﬁts increases total months in employment over a 10-year period by 7
months (9%) and wage income by about 22,000 Euros (9%). The corresponding decrease
in unemployment-related beneﬁts leads to a smaller eﬀect on total earned income which
increases by 13,000 Euros (4%). The spouse's labor force participation does not appear
to be aﬀected and the eﬀects on household disposable income are subdued. Our results
indicate that higher levels of unemployment at older ages do not aﬀect mortality during
our observation period. Disability and sickness beneﬁts do not appear to be aﬀected
either, which is in line with previous Finnish studies and indicates that spillover eﬀects
into these beneﬁt types may not be a major concern.
Since our data include information on all transfers that individuals residing in Finland
have received and paid, we can perform a back of the envelope analysis of the total ﬁscal
impact of the reform. The improved labor market outcomes caused by the increase in the
age limit of extended beneﬁts led to an increase of 15,000 Euros (60%) on average in net
transfers paid during our 10-year observation period. Considering the cohort size of 33,000
individuals employed in the private sector at the beginning of the period, this implies that
the total ﬁscal impact of increasing the age limit of extended beneﬁts by two years was
an increase of up to 500 million Euros in net payments to the society during the 10-year
period for a single birth cohort. Taking into account the fact that the reform aﬀected all
subsequent cohorts, this can be viewed as a substantial impact on public ﬁnances.
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